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Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter is on practice and what informs it—the influence that Pierre 
Bourdieu names as the ‘habitus’—but also on how practice forms the habitus. In making 
explicit the potential influence of practice on habitus, we seek to extend Bourdieu’s account 
of how the habitus is shaped and reshaped. We illustrate these issues within the context of 
prescribed approaches to accountability within academic research. 
 
The chapter proceeds along three lines. First, it sets out a detailed account of Bourdieu’s 
conception/s of practice, the relationship between habitus and practice, and the role of 
pedagogic work in the formation and reformation of the habitus within fields. Comparatively 
little attention has been given to these matters within higher education research literature. 
Second, the chapter aims to extend understandings of the role of practice in re/forming the 
habitus, in particular in response to an agent’s own practices. Third, and in response to the 
first two, we explore what these concepts and their extension mean for the field of higher 
education, specifically in relation to academic workloads and how these determine the 
proportion of time allocated to research. Our intention here is to elucidate how we conceive 
of practice rather than to be definitive of academic workloads and their application. 
 
What is Bourdieu’s theory of practice? 
 
Bourdieu did not offer a simple definition of practice, acknowledging that ‘It is not easy to 
speak of practice other than negatively – especially those aspects of practice that are 
seemingly most mechanical, most opposed to the logic of thought and discourse’ (1990b, p. 
80). In a gesture towards specificity, Bourdieu’s seminal text Distinction offers the formula: 
‘[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice’ (1984, p. 101). However, its precise meaning is 
unclear beyond the rather general idea that ‘it is through the workings of habitus that practice 
… is linked with capital and field’ (Reay 2004b, p. 432). 
 
For Bourdieu, the field or ‘social universe’ is a space in which agents ‘are defined by their 
relative positions’ according to the amount and worth of the capital they hold (1985, p. 724). 
Fields are both ‘identifiable and bounded’ but they are also ‘saturated with interests’ and so 
are never neutral spaces (Grenfell 2012a, pp. 30, original emphasis). Capital comprises 
valued resources of various types (social, economic, cultural) with the worth of the capital 
being determined within specific fields (Bourdieu 1986; Swartz 1997). Within a given field 
agents are in competition with one another for the largest share of the most highly prized 
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capital and also in an effort to increase the comparative value of the capital or capitals they 
possess (Bourdieu 1986). Thus, fields comprise contested hierarchies of agents and capitals 
(Grenfell 2010) while it is practice that enables the accumulation of different kinds of capital 
in different fields (Rawolle & Lingard 2013, p. 126). 
 
The meaning and purpose of practice is particular to fields. Even within specific fields, 
practice is not a unitary phenomenon but has a number of ‘dimensions’ (Bourdieu 1977, p. 
163). Thus, Warde names three different but related ways in which Bourdieu refers to the 
idea of practice (2004, pp. 5–6)i. 
 
First, practice is juxtaposed to theory (see for example Wacquant 1989). A substantial theme 
of Bourdieu’s work is theorising the ‘distance’ between the ‘truth of the academic world and 
of the social world in general’ or between what Bourdieu thought of as scientific knowledge 
and the practical experience of everyday life (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 70), which he 
referred to as the difference between the ‘logic of science’ and the ‘logic of practice’. In brief, 
the logic that informs practice is ‘fuzzy’: it ‘can only be grasped in action, in the temporal 
movement that distinguishes it’ (Bourdieu 1990b, p. 92). 
 
Second, Bourdieu uses the notion of practice to refer to a ‘more or less coherent entity 
formed around a particular activity’ or a ‘coordinated, recognisable and institutionally 
supported practice’ (Warde 2004, p. 6). Here, Bourdieu is referring to a recognisable domain 
of activity and examples might include a formally organised sporting activity (1984, p. 218), 
a doctor’s practice or a specifically named policy or practice review (Rawolle & Lingard 
2008), such as a state facilitated review of higher education. 
 
Third, practice refers to undertaking some activity or other, alternatively described as 
‘manifest behaviours’ (Warde 2004, p. 6). However, in Bourdieu’s reckoning, such activity is 
only practice when it is purposeful and meaningful. Thus, action does not inevitably 
constitute practice and so ‘it is necessary to abandon all theories which explicitly or implicitly 
treat practice as a mechanical reaction’ (Bourdieu 1977, p. 73). Examples of this conception 
of practice include the act of giving of a gift (Bourdieu 1990b) or the doing of scientific 
research (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). 
 
Warde argues that in the second half of his career Bourdieu allowed his ‘theory of practice to 
fall into desuetude’, displaced by the more ‘fully developed concept of field’ (2004, p. 3). 
Conversely, for Rawolle, Bourdieu’s theory of practice ‘foregrounds’ and underpins his 
entire ‘sociological approach’ (2010b, p. 26) where, in later work, practice serves not only as 
the ‘underlying theme and problematic’ but also as the ‘object of research’ (2010a, p. 125). 
That is, Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field and capital were developed as a way of 
understanding and explaining practice, rather than to make up for some inadequacy or 
incommensurability within the theory of practice as Bourdieu had conceived it (Rawolle & 
Lingard 2013). Rawolle thus argues that Bourdieu’s theory of practice is, at one and the same 
time, his theory of the social world. 
 
Bourdieu understood practice as the outcome of internalised knowledge that is borne from 
history but which manifests as an agent’s skills, proficiencies and competencies, enabling 
them to understand what is transpiring and what might transpire so as to achieve a particular 
goal or purpose (Webb 2012). He therefore likened practice to playing a game (Bourdieu 
1990b). Games are temporal, played by agents with a ‘sense of the history of the game’ who 
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at the same time have mastered ‘in a practical way the future of the game’, enabling them to 
anticipate the future ‘flow of the game’ (Bourdieu 1998, p. 81). By way of illustration: 
 
A player who is involved and caught up in the game adjusts not to what he 
[sic] sees but to what he fore-sees, sees in advance in the directly perceived 
present; he passes the ball not to the spot where his team-mate is but to the 
spot he will reach … a moment later, anticipating the anticipations of the other 
[the opponent] and … seeking to confound them. … And he does so ‘on the 
spot’, ‘in the twinkling of an eye’, ‘in the heat of the moment’ … He is 
launched into the impending future, present in the imminent moment. 
(Bourdieu 1990b, pp. 81–2) 
 
A characteristic of most games, sporting or otherwise, is that they are competitive and this 
raises the question of whether practice is always associated with competition within a field. 
Warde (2004) argues that the use of game as a metaphor for practice is contentious because it 
works only in very specific circumstances and he provides examples of apparently non-
competitive activities, such as solo swimming (for the purposes of relaxation) and home 
decorating, which exhibit fewer features of ‘relationality and hierarchy’ (2004, p. 20). But 
competition is not completely absent from these either. For example, in Warde’s illustration 
of home decoration, while the practice might not be part of an organised sport or part of a 
formally organised competition (although sometimes that can be the case), it is nonetheless 
part of a competitive ‘game’ aimed at ‘distinction and position taking’ within a field (Warde 
2004, p. 21). Bourdieu argues that not only do some games require participants to be 
‘”disinterested” in order to succeed’, they may well be precluded from consciously 
understanding this paradox by both the rules of the game and the characteristics of the field in 
which it is played (1998, p. 83). Games are therefore social and field specific, played within a 
particular social space (Bourdieu 1990b). 
 
Competition and game are so significant in Bourdieu’s account of fields of practice that at 
times he uses the terms field and game interchangeably, although this does not necessarily 
mean that he always thought of games and fields as one and the same (Warde 2004, p. 9). It is 
more likely that a particular game, or a dominant game, may define a specific field (for 
example, its boundaries, its primary characteristics) rather than all games being fields and 
vice versa. It is the case that many practices are specific to certain fields and that fields can be 
defined and characterised by their specific logics of practice (Grenfell 2012a). For example, 
teaching practices take place in the field of education while research and scholarship take 
place within the subfield of higher education (albeit not exclusively). Thus, in considering 
what defines a field it is useful to identify the predominant practice evident therein. 
 
It is the habitus that enables an agent to embody the game in what Bourdieu describes as 
being ‘in the present in relation to a coming moment’ (Bourdieu 1998, p. 82) or as a 
‘presence in the future’ (Bourdieu 1990b, p. 82). So close is the relationship between habitus 
and practice that Rawolle and Lingard describe it as a ‘couplet’ (2013, p. 123). It is not only 
the case that habitus is reflected in practice (Bourdieu 1977) but that the concepts of habitus 
and practice share some of the same characteristics. For example, Bourdieu describes practice 
as organised strategy ‘without being the product of genuine strategic intention’ (1977, p. 73) 
or that which ‘understands only in order to act’ (1990b, p. 91). Bourdieu contrasts practice 
with ‘reflexive attention to itself’ and thus differentiates it from scientific or scholarly 
analysis which attempts to understand and explain, for its own sake (1990b, p. 91). In this 
way, Bourdieu’s notion of practice goes beyond a ‘conscious/unconscious’ dichotomy 
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(Grenfell 2012a, p. 29). The intuitive nature of practice is quite similar to that quality of the 
habitus that ‘function[s] below the level of consciousness’ (Bourdieu 1984, p. 466). It is these 
and other similarities that have led Crossley to describe Bourdieu’s theory of habitus as ‘a 
partial theory of practice’ (2001, p. 95). 
 
Habitus and its relationship to practice 
 
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus has been subject to substantial criticism, principally with 
regard to determinism (Jenkins 1982), that the habitus does not provide sufficient capacity for 
agency or self-transformation (Lukes 2005). Yet Bourdieu argued vigorously that charges of 
determinism reflect an inadequate understanding of his overall theoretical framework 
(Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Others have argued similarly that changed 
practices arise from the interaction between habitus and field (Swartz 1997). 
 
Throughout his work Bourdieu sought to use the conceptual and methodological tool of 
habitus to resolve or transcend the dualisms of agency/structure and objectivity/subjectivity 
(Bourdieu 1990b), such that ‘[i]t is through the workings of habitus that practice (agency) is 
linked with capital and field (structure)’ (Reay 2004b, p. 432). Bourdieu described habitus as 
‘an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in 
which it is constituted’ (1977, p. 95). Thus, habitus is produced by the social world and 
serves as a ‘durable and transposable but not immutable’ means through which agents 
perceive, understand and interact in that world (Grenfell 2012b, p. 52). Yet Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus is also complex, multifaceted and multilayered. Arising from his 
ethnographic work in a Chicago boxing gym, Wacquant discusses a number of specific 
properties of the habitus as Bourdieu conceived it.  
 
First, habitus comprises dispositions that are developed rather than being innate (Wacquant 
2011). For example, Bourdieu describes habitus as ‘an acquired system of … schemes’ 
(1977, p. 95), learnt not in a sentient, purposeful way, but more through a process of meaning 
making (Bourdieu 1984, p. 170). Thus Wacquant describes dispositions, which are both 
instilled and inscribed, as specific ‘abilities, categories, and desires’ (2011, p. 85).  
 
A second and related principle is that the habitus operates below the ‘level of consciousness 
and discourse’ (Wacquant 2011, pp. 86, original emphasis). Agents are generally not aware 
of, do not actively engage with and do not explicate the habitus, which nonetheless shapes 
their thoughts, aspirations, perceptions, judgements, behaviours and interactions (Bourdieu & 
Passeron 1977).  
 
Third, the dispositions that comprise an agent’s habitus vary according to ‘location and 
trajectory’ (Wacquant 2011, p. 86, original emphasis). For example, Bourdieu describes the 
habitus as being ‘objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted’ 
(1977, p. 95). Habitus arises out of, or is a product of, the physical and social conditions 
within which the agent operates. It does this not only by shaping how the field is comprised 
and how it should operate but also because the habitus expresses ‘the social position in which 
it was constructed’ (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 131), typically referring to an expression of social 
class.  
 
A fourth and related characteristic of habitus is that it is inculcated through a process known 
as pedagogic work (Wacquant 2011, p. 86), which produces the primary habitus, 
characteristic of the earliest class or group to which the agent belongs as a child, and also any 
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subsequent formation and reformation of the habitus (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 42). 
Habitus is therefore a product of history and leads to relatively consistent and predicable 
behaviour, but it is not unchanging or unresponsive to the present (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 77). 
For example, Crossley asserts that ‘[i]f users are acting, thinking and identifying themselves 
differently from how they used to, in a regularized way, then their habitus must have been 
transformed’ (1999, p. 649). This results from what Reay describes as a ‘complex interplay 
between past and present’ (2004b, p. 434). The notion of pedagogic work and other means of 
habitus transformation are discussed further below. 
 
In a similar vein to Wacquant, it is possible to identify additional ways in which Bourdieu 
characterises the habitus. For example, habitus is generated or produced but it is also 
generative (Bourdieu 1977, p. 95). This is what Swartz describes as the ‘two faces of habitus’ 
(2002, p. 635) and it is what Bourdieu means when he characterises habitus as ‘structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 1977, p. 72). Second, 
habitus generates or produces practice together with an understanding of and desire for 
particular practices organised in particular ways and within particular limits. Reay argues that 
this means habitus not only ‘allows for individual agency, it also predisposes individuals 
towards certain ways of behaving’ (2004b, p. 433). That is, while Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus suggests that agents are less likely to engage in culturally unfamiliar practices, 
habitus is also not a synonym for rules and prescriptive behaviours. Third, the relationship 
between habitus and the social world is both metaphysical and physical in that through 
habitus agents carry the structures of their social world within them, in internalised, 
embodied form (Bourdieu 1990a). This is what Bourdieu means when he notes that ‘[t]he 
body is in the social world but the social world is also in the body’ (1990a, p. 190). The 
habitus becomes the means through which the social world is expressed such as through 
practices related to accent, manners, styles of dress and modes of deportment (Reay 2004b).  
 
A further characteristic of habitus is that it can also be collective (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992), operating as ‘a system of shared social dispositions and cognitive structures which 
generates perceptions, appreciations and actions’ (Bourdieu 1988, p. 279). The issue here is 
not so much that habitus is either individual or collective. Instead, dispositions that constitute 
the habitus and are held individually can also be shared across a group or community by 
virtue of common or homologous conditions or circumstances, or shared history (Bourdieu 
1990b). This, in turn, can lead to common or shared practices and beliefs without those 
practices and beliefs being subject to any formal organisation or co-ordination. Thus, 
Bourdieu described a ‘linguistic habitus’ (1991, p. 21) and a professorial habitus (1988). It is 
also habitus that enables the transfer of certain practices from one field to another (Bourdieu 
1984, p. 173). 
 
Pedagogic work and formation/reformation of the habitus 
 
As noted above, Bourdieu describes the process by which habitus is produced as involving 
pedagogic work (PW) within which the social conditions of the field are internalised as 
habitus and misrecognised as natural and desirable. Pedagogic work legitimates the culture of 
the dominant group while representing the culture of those on the periphery as illegitimate 
(Bourdieu & Passeron 1977). 
 
Pedagogic work comprises a series of prolonged actions that may or may not be consciously 
purposeful (Gale & Mills 2013). Its foundation is what Bourdieu describes as pedagogic 
action (PA): a practice that operates by exerting symbolic violence, defined as ‘power which 
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manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power 
relations which are the basis of its force’ (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 4). The effect of this 
concealment is that agents are complicit in the exercise of the domination to which they are 
subject (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Thus pedagogic work helps to maintain the ‘broader 
social system’ by authenticating and defining cultural goods and by creating and legitimising 
consumers of those goods (Bredo & Feinberg 2006, p. 319). Pedagogic actions involve more 
than passive transmission because they ‘stamp’ the cultural message, and the ‘consequences 
of receiving it or not, as valid and important’ (Robbins 2004, p. 318).  
 
Bourdieu refers to pedagogic action as the practice of education but he means education in its 
broadest sense rather than only that exercised by formally designated educational institutions 
such as schools and universities (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977). Thus, the first site where 
pedagogic work takes effect—primary pedagogic work—is within the family or ‘domestic 
group’ (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 6). The primary habitus that it produces is long-lasting 
insofar as it is ‘capable of perpetuating itself after the PA has ceased’ (Bourdieu & Passeron 
1977, p. 31). It is also transposable, in that it is ‘capable of generating practices conforming 
with the principles of the inculcated arbitrary in a greater number of different fields’ 
(Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 33). Other sites in which primary pedagogic work takes place 
include one’s extended family and wider community. Primary pedagogic work forms the 
basis for any subsequent habitus formation or reformation. Indeed, Bourdieu states that ‘[t]he 
success of all school education, and more generally of all secondary PW, depends 
fundamentally on the education previously accomplished in the earliest years of life’ 
(Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 43). Thus, secondary pedagogic work takes place in the 
context of formal educational institutions and schooling (Gale & Mills 2013) and beyond, 
such as in the workplace.  
 
Case exemplar 
 
In part, the value of Bourdieu’s account of practice and habitus lies in the strength of the 
explanation it provides of empirical contexts. However, our intent in presenting the case 
exemplar that follows is not so much to test the explanatory power of Bourdieu’s concepts 
but to extend them. The exemplar is focused on an academic workload model and draws on 
data from one of Australia’s newer teaching and research universities. Academic workload 
models are not new although the application of standardised formulae for allocating workload 
to teaching, research and administration or service activities for individual academics is 
becoming more widespread across the UK, Australia and Europe, in particular. The exemplar 
seeks to highlight a prescribed approach to an aspect of academic work, with a specific focus 
on research analysed through the lens of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. We consider whether, 
in response to the demands of the situation, an agent’s own practices play a role in shaping or 
reshaping the academic habitus within the field. That is, is it possible for an agent to engage 
in pedagogic work on their own habitus, even though it is largely unconscious? 
 
Exemplar: research output as a contributor to academic workload calculations 
 
In many universities the proportion of an academic’s workload allocated to research is 
determined on the basis of their research output in preceding years—usually over a rolling 
three-year period. In making such determinations, it is common for numerical targets to be set 
as a measure of research output, taking into account such indicators as the number of 
publications of varying types, the number of PhD students supervised to completion and the 
monetary value of external research grants. While these models vary in detail, they are 
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common across similar institutions and national boundaries (Barrett & Barrett 2008). They 
represent examples of a numerical approach to quality assurance and form part of what 
Lingard (2011) describes as a ‘policy as numbers’ approach to the global governance of 
educational research.  
 
We recognise that in addition to numerical indicators of research output, measurement and 
assessment of research impact or utility are also a significant focus, both in other models and 
in other parts of the higher education field (Colley 2013). However, in our analysis, we 
specifically focus on the targets for publications in our case-institution, in which one point is 
allocated for each sole-authored journal article published in a journal recognised by the 
national research assessment scheme (ERA: Excellence in Research, Australia), five points 
are allocated for a research-based book or monograph published with a recognised academic 
publisher, and so on. To be designated as research active in our case institution and thereby 
achieve the standard 40% teaching, 40% research and 20% service workload allocation, 
academics must meet or exceed designated thresholds for research points according to their 
level of appointment. For academics at lecturer level, the threshold standard for research 
output points is somewhat lower than for senior lecturers, which is lower than the points 
required of associate professors/readers, and so on. However, for all academics at this 
university, publication point thresholds are increasing year-on-year. Specifically, within 
academic units covering the humanities, arts, social sciences and education, thresholds in our 
case-institution increased by 50% between 2014 and 2015.  
 
Although the stated aim of the research program at this university is to achieve research 
outputs of the highest quality, the model appears to focus primarily on the number of books 
or journal articles published. In short, there is significant contradiction between the specified 
aims of the research program to produce quality outputs and the publication practices 
rewarded by the model. However, as is also the case elsewhere, the university’s academic 
promotion process appears to reward publication quality over quantity. Thus, a smaller 
number of journal articles published in top-ranked international journals are often more 
highly regarded for promotion purposes than a larger number of journal articles published in 
local, low-status journals. This recognition within the academic promotions process of the 
quality of research output reflects its role in building a high-status research-based career over 
the longer term (Blackmore 2010). 
 
For early career researchers in particular, the tension between these two conflicting measures 
of success is palpable and often results in some form of trade-off. For example, the effect of 
not meeting research active publication output thresholds is potentially more immediately 
concerning for many than the prospect of promotion some years down the track. Under the 
model, being designated as ‘non-research active’ results in a research time allowance of 20% 
or less and a corresponding substantial increase in teaching allocation. In turn, this makes 
devoting time to research more difficult and so the prospect of being non-research active is 
more likely to continue.  
 
Our analysis of these matters focuses on the effect of the research output targets on the 
practices of academics attempting to comply with the requirements of the model as they 
strive to achieve or retain research active status. For very early career researchers, who are 
unlikely to have been an academic long enough to have supervised a higher degree research 
student to completion or to have secured a large external research grant, the most feasible 
way of obtaining research points is through publication. Thus, the practices under 
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consideration are not only those involved with the calculation of research points but also the 
practices of conducting, writing and publishing research itself. 
 
Can practice have a role in shaping and reshaping the habitus? 
 
Above we noted that within Bourdieu’s theory of practice, it is habitus that generates or 
produces practice within fields. For this reason, it is commonly understood that an agent’s 
habitus can be read from their practice, at least partially. In fact, Bourdieu says as much 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Although an agent’s habitus sits beneath their level of 
consciousness, the practices in which they engage can provide a window through which the 
habitus can be seen and understood. However, Bourdieu also indicates that this relationship 
between habitus and practice is not one-way. In Outline of a Theory of Practice he notes that 
the habitus is ‘determined by the past conditions which have produced the principle of their 
production, that is, by the actual outcome of identical or interchangeable past practices’ 
(Bourdieu 1977, pp. 72–3). This suggests that an agent’s habitus not only influences their 
practice but that the things agents have done in the past also contribute to shaping their 
habitus.  
 
On the face of it, this seems a relatively obvious and straightforward idea. It was noted earlier 
that a key link between practice and habitus is the notion of pedagogic work. It is through the 
pedagogic work of others that the habitus is formed, shaped and reshaped. However, it is also 
possible to interpret Bourdieu’s theory of practice as suggesting that agents’ practices, the 
things they have done previously, may have contributed to shaping and reshaping their own 
habitus; that they are, in fact, engaged in pedagogic work on themselves. This is implied in 
Swartz’s examples of pedagogic work as including ‘imitation, repetition, role-play, and game 
participation’ (2002, p. 635). These are all activities in which individuals engage 
themselves—within whichever field they may be located at the time. The link between 
practice, habitus and the past is important here because habitus is somewhat more inclined to 
reflect the past than the present (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 77). If an agent’s own practices 
contribute to shaping the habitus then it is very likely to be the practices of the past involved 
in that shaping. By extension, the practices of the present shape the habitus of the future. 
 
Many of the practices undertaken by academics seeking to comply with research output 
measures, as part of workload allocation models, are an agent’s own. While individual 
academics do not generally contribute to determining the publication targets they must meet 
in order to be considered research active—although they may have some opportunity to 
comment during a consultation process—they do have agency to determine how they wish to 
respond to the model and to tailor their practices accordingly. For some, the choices are 
relatively easy. They can mobilise their intellectual capital to produce sufficiently large 
numbers of high quality publications to both meet institutional targets and establish or retain 
their position within their global disciplinary field. For others, the new academic ‘game’ is 
more difficult. Some may choose to submit large numbers of articles to low-status journals 
with high acceptance rates simply to meet institutional targets, with little regard for future 
promotion prospects. Others might seek inclusion as an author on publications in which they 
have had little or no input. In both cases, the research practices of academics change in 
response to the research output calculation model. 
 
The Bourdieuian concepts of a collective academic habitus (Reay 2004a) and of intellectual 
capital within disciplinary fields (Bourdieu 1988) are well known. Intellectual capital 
represents scholarly reputation and is primarily accumulated through research output, 
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exemplified by the central and dominant place of research within global university ranking 
scales (Rowlands 2013). It follows, then, that practices that constitute secondary pedagogic 
work and thus contribute to any reshaping of the academic habitus will be research practices. 
Research practice has a particular logic that is specific to traditionally autonomous 
disciplinary fields (Henkel 2007). For example, research within the physical sciences has a 
different logic of practice—a different way of conceiving, theorising and undertaking 
research—to that of the social sciences. In turn, it is these different logics of practice that 
contribute to defining academic disciplines as separate, global, fields. Moreover, the global 
communities of scholars that comprise these fields define these fields in a way that is 
traditionally independent of the university at which they are each employed (Macfarlane 
2012). 
 
At the same time, universities sit within a global field of higher education (Marginson 2010). 
In contrast to the disciplinary fields within which intellectual capital dominates, academic 
capital currently dominates the higher education field and is accumulated through position 
taking within the organisational hierarchy (Kloot 2009). The prevailing logic of practice 
within this field is corporate managerialism, defined as the adoption within public sector 
entities of ideologies and practices drawn from the private or business sector (Deem & 
Brehony 2005). Key foci of this practice are efficiency, accountability, value-for-money and 
executive-dominated corporate and entrepreneurial-style governance practices. The research 
output model described within our case exemplar is a clear instance of managerial practice, 
influenced by external research assessment exercises such as the Research Evaluation 
Framework (REF) in the UK and Excellence for Research in Australia (ERA). Both the 
academic and managerial habitus are examples of what Bourdieu describes as ‘specific 
habitus’: dispositions required within a particular field or fields (2000, p. 99). 
 
Academics working within universities straddle both their disciplinary field and the 
management-dominated institutional field of higher education. As a result, they commonly 
undertake both disciplinary-based research practice and managerial practices aimed at 
complying with internal and external reporting and accountability requirements. And while 
much research is undertaken in disciplinary fields, research on higher education itself—in 
areas such as teaching, learning and higher education systems—is increasingly common 
(Altbach 2014). That is, the two fields (of higher education and specific disciplines) do not 
operate as unrelated, isolated social spaces. Moreover, the habitus is transposable, ‘capable of 
generating practices conforming with the principles of the inculcated arbitrary in a greater 
number of different fields’ (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 33). Indeed, the phenomena of 
cross-field effects, where practices from one field impact on practices or are taken up in 
another, is now well established (Rawolle 2010a). Although, Maton (2005) argues that the 
autonomy of higher education as a field is far more resistant to influences from outside the 
field (i.e. challenges to ‘relational’ autonomy) than it is to the influences of outside actors 
installed into positions of power within the field (i.e. challenges to ‘positional’ autonomy). 
 
A key issue, then, is the extent to which practices from one of these fields might potentially 
impact on the shaping or reshaping of the specific habitus associated with the other. While 
this is a subject for future research, two existing studies do provide some insight. First, Cheng 
(2011) examined the impact of external quality audits conducted within the UK on the 
teaching practices of academics. She found that because the audits were initiated by an 
external body, academics felt that the audit had symbolic rather than actual control over their 
work— there was little, if any, impact on their day-to-day practice (Cheng 2010). Staff were 
able to make strategic decisions to comply with the requirements of the audit process on the 
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surface while continuing to teach in their preferred manner within the classroom and 
elsewhere (Cheng 2011). This is consistent with Bourdieu’s argument that in response to the 
specific demands of the field at a given moment in time, agents can make  ‘a strategic 
calculation tending to carry on quasi-consciously the operation [while] the habitus carries on 
in quite a different way’ (Bourdieu 1977, p. 76; 1990b, p. 108).  
 
Unlike Cheng’s study, the research output metrics within our case exemplar have a direct and 
unequivocal impact on academics’ day-to-day work because the outcome determines the 
proportion of their workload allocated to teaching, research and service respectively. This is 
not symbolic but actual and direct control. In a study of four New Zealand academics, 
Waitere and others found that research output calculation models—which classified staff in 
one of four categories from highly research active to not research active for the purposes of 
workload allocation—had a significant impact not only on research practices but also on how 
these academics conceived of themselves as researchers ‘playing an elaborate game’ (Waitere 
et al. 2011, p. 206). The metaphor of a game is used here to describe not only performative 
practices required to comply with the requirement to count research output but also the way 
research is now being conceived and conducted: 
 
… short-term outcomes are now embraced with the oppressive knowledge of 
the need to publish in the window that will allow your article to see the light of 
day before the next PBRF round. (Waitere et al. 2011, p. 206) 
 
While Bourdieu is careful to point out that habitus is not the only driver of practice (1977), he 
also asserts that primary pedagogic work and, therefore the primary habitus, are not 
necessarily fixed or absolute. Secondary pedagogic work can bring about what Bourdieu and 
Passeron describe as a ‘radical conversion’ by ‘killing off’ the old habitus and ‘engendering 
the new habitus ex nihilo’ (1977, p. 44). The ‘deculturating and reculturating’ techniques 
required to achieve this are not everyday occurrences but are extreme, found in what 
Bourdieu and Passeron describe as ‘’total’ institutions [such as] barracks, convents, prisons, 
asylums, boarding schools’ (1977, p. 44). In general terms, the efficiency of secondary 
pedagogic work is determined by the level of similarity between the habitus it is seeking to 
produce and the pre-existing primary habitus (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977). The greater the 
difference, the more pedagogic work is required to bring the secondary habitus into line with 
the field. The process that Bourdieu describes as ‘hysteresis’ arises from a substantial 
discrepency between the habitus of an agent and the field in which they are situated 
(Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 2000). Responding to this discrepency in such a way as to ‘to 
recognize, grasp and occupy … new field positions’, can result in a significant transformation 
of the habitus, especially for agents who hold sufficient capital to recognise and take 
advantage of this as an opportunity (Grenfell 2012b, p. 135). A more minor discrepancy may 
result in what is described by Bourdieu as ‘adaptation’ (Bourdieu 2000, p. 161) where the 
habitus adjusts to the demands of the field.  
 
Thus, where the gap between the habitus of an agent and the demands or requirements of the 
field is substantial, secondary pedagogic work may transform the habitus to produce a closer 
alignment. However, this is not the only possible response. Agents may also withdraw from 
the field in an act of self-selection (Swartz 2002) or experience ‘inertia in the habitus’ 
resulting in an inability to take advantage of the prospects a transformation of the field may 
provide (Grenfell 2012b, p. 135). Less common, but evident in examples of social dissent, is 
when agents choose to remain present so as to protest against (and therefore seek to change) 
those conditions of the field that have produced the discrepancy. In this they oppose what 
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Bourdieu described as the doxa of the field, ‘the point of view of the dominant’ (1998, p. 57). 
Bourdieu’s concept of illusio is also useful here because it describes the value of the game 
being played in the field (Bourdieu 1993), regardless of whether all agents consider that game 
to be something they want to play (Colley & Guery 2015; Rowlands & Rawolle 2013). 
Bourdieu gives the example of agents ‘wanting to undertake a revolution in a field’ as 
evidence of illusio, that the game being played in that field is of sufficient importance to 
make a revolution both imaginable and desirable (1998, p. 78). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have sought to convey a sense of Bourdieu’s account of practice and of its 
sophistication. Bourdieu argues that one’s practices are informed by one’s habitus and are 
produced in interaction with the field in which one is located; practice is the product of 
habitus-field interactions. Further, one’s habitus is the result of pedagogic work, which 
conforms the habitus (and, therefore, future practice) to the logic of the field. The habitus is 
thus the embodiment of the cultural capital of the field. In providing this account, we have 
also sought to extend it – albeit in keeping with Bourdieu’s own inclinations—arguing that 
one’s own practices also constitute pedagogic work on one’s own habitus. That is, past 
practice has played a role in shaping the habitus of the present and current practice can play a 
role in shaping the habitus of the future. In bringing Bourdieu’s theory of practice to bear on 
academic workload models, we suggest that practices required of academics to comply with 
publication output targets have a substantial impact not only on academic practice but 
potentially contribute to a reshaping of the academic habitus and, in turn, to a redefinition of 
what it means to be a researcher and to actually do research. 
 
Further, the analysis allows us to speculate that academics may respond to research output 
targets within academic workload models in different ways, depending in part on the 
respective amounts of academic, intellectual and other capitals they possess. For academics 
with high levels of intellectual capital and research outputs that easily meet the designated 
targets, no change to academic practice might be required at all. But at least two other 
responses are also possible. A second group, with relatively lower levels of intellectual 
capital, might be disposed to opt out of the game altogether, giving up before even attempting 
to meet their publication output target, given the extent of the gap between the schemes of the 
habitus and the demands of the field. For many, this would mean a significantly increased 
teaching allocation and changed academic practice, by virtue of less time allocated to 
research. For a third group, disposed to engage in the game and with somewhat higher levels 
of academic capital, a performative approach might result in changed academic practice. In 
this instance, there could be a tendency to ‘pump out the pubs’ at whatever standard is 
required to ‘get over the line’ and worry about building a high-status research career ‘down 
the track’, if at all. For groups two and three, if this changed academic practice continued 
over the longer term, it could take the form of secondary pedagogic work and potentially 
impact on a reshaping of the habitus, including the collective academic habitus, reducing the 
size of the gap between these and the higher education field. In turn, there might be 
corresponding increases in the size of the gap between these modified academic habitus and 
the demands of the disciplinary field. 
 
While these are speculative accounts of the effects of academic workload models that include 
metrics-based research outputs and clearly require further research to validate, they are 
nonetheless a logical outworking of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. In the same way, we 
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suggest that one’s own practice is at work on the habitus to inform future practice. For this 
reason, we are concerned by the potential longer-term impact of the practices required of 
academics to comply with these models on both the nature of research practice itself and on 
their identities as academics and researchers. However, it is also possible to envisage a fourth 
response to the demands of numerically-based research output targets described in this 
chapter that have become doxa within the field in Australia and elsewhere. This would see 
academics attempting to change not only the dominant game but also the field in which it is 
being played; that is, where their illusio, or recognition of the stakes of the game that 
comprises academic workload models based on numerical targets for research output, results 
in participation in that game so as to achieve a transformation of it (see Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992, p. 99). The extent to which this fourth response is possible turns on whether 
academic publication practices are scientific, or ordinary in nature. As noted earlier, agents 
are largely unaware of the logic governing everyday or ordinary practice (Bourdieu 1990b), 
in contrast to the reflexivity associated with scientific research practices (James 2014). 
 
In Bourdieu’s terms, what is needed here are strategies to discredit the value of the ordinary 
practice of counting research outputs on a numerical basis as a proxy for quality and to 
increase the value of new knowledge for its own sake as an outcome of scientific practice. 
Thus, while ‘impact’ is a central interest of education research which is traditionally close to 
education practice, measurement of this research impact is also not necessarily the answer 
Colley (2013). Similarly, we cannot achieve transformation of the rules of the game if we 
have exited the field or disengaged from it to the extent that our research becomes merely a 
performative exercise. If the goals of critical sociology include not only critiquing what is 
current but also making way for what is yet to come, then it is incumbent upon each of us to 
shape the collective academic habitus of the future through reflexive and disruptive 
individual research practices in the present. 
 
 
13 
 
References 
 
Altbach, PG 2014, 'The emergence of a field: research and training in higher education', 
Studies in Higher Education, vol. 39, no. 8, pp. 1306–20. 
 
Barrett, L & Barrett, P 2008, Management of Academic Workloads: Full report on findings, 
Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, London. 
 
Blackmore, J 2010, 'Research assessment: a calculative technology governing quality, 
accountability and equity', in J Blackmore, M Brennan & L Zipin (eds), Re-Positioning 
University Governance and Academic Work Sense, Rotterdam, pp. 67–84. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1977, Outline of a theory of practice, Cambridge University Prress, Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1984, Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste, Routledge & 
Keegan Paul, London. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1985, 'The social space and the genesis of groups', Theory and Society, vol. 14, 
no. 6, pp. 723–44. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1986, 'The forms of capital', in JG Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education, Greenwood, New York, pp. 241–58. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1988, Homo Academicus, Polity, Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1990a, In Other Words: Essays towards a reflexive sociology, Polity, 
Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1990b, The Logic of Practice, Polity, Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1991, Language and Symbolic Power, Policy, Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1993, The Field of Cultural Production, Polity, Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P 1998, Practical Reason: On the theory of action, Polity, Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P 2000, Pascalian Meditations, Polity, Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P & Passeron, J-C 1977, Reproduction: In education, society and culture, Sage, 
London. 
 
Bourdieu, P & Wacquant, LJD 1992, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Polity Press in 
association with Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge. 
 
Bredo, E & Feinberg, W 2006, Meaning, power and pedagogy: Pierre Bourdieu and Jean‐
Claude Passeron, reproduction in education, society and culture, patent, 4. 
 
Cheng, M 2010, 'Audit cultures and quality assurance mechanisms in England: a study of 
their perceived impact on the work of academics', Teaching in Higher Education, vol. 15, no. 
3, pp. 259–71. 
14 
 
 
Cheng, M 2011, 'The perceived impact of quality audit on the work of academics', Higher 
Education Research & Development, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 179–91. 
 
Colley, H 2013, 'What (a) to do about ‘impact’: a Bourdieusian critique', British Educational 
Research Journal, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 660–81, DOI 10.1002/berj.3112. 
 
Colley, H & Guery, F 2015, 'Understanding new hybrid professions: Bourdieu, illusio and the 
case of public servant interpreters', Cambridge Journal of Education, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 113–
31. 
 
Crossley, N 1999, 'Fish, field, habitus and madness: the first wave mental health users 
movement in Great Britain', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 647–70. 
 
Crossley, N 2001, The Social Body: Habit, identity and desire, Sage, London. 
 
Deem, R & Brehony, K 2005, 'Management as ideology: the case of 'new managerialism' in 
higher education', Oxford Review of Education, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 217–35. 
 
Gale, T & Mills, C 2013, 'Creating spaces in higher education for marginalised Australians: 
principles for socially inclusive pedagogies'. 
 
Grenfell, M 2010, 'Being critical: the practical logic of Bourdieu’s metanoia', Critical Studies 
in Education, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 85–99. 
 
Grenfell, M 2012a, Bourdieu, Language and Linguistics, Bloomsbury, London. 
 
Grenfell, M 2012b, Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, Acumen, Stocksfield, England. 
 
Henkel, M 2007, 'Can academic autonomy survive in the knowledge society? A perspective 
from Britain', Higher Education Research & Development, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 87–99. 
 
James, D 2014, 'Investigating the curriculum through assessment practice in higher 
education: the value of a learning cultures' approach', Higher Education, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 
155–69. 
 
Jenkins, R 1982, 'Pierre Bourdieu and the reproduction of determinism', Sociology, vol. 16, 
no. 2, pp. 270–81. 
 
Kloot, B 2009, 'Exploring the value of Bourdieu's framework in the context of institutional 
change', Studies in Higher Education, vol. 34, no. 4  pp. 469–81. 
 
Lingard, B 2011, 'Policy as numbers: ac/counting for educational research', Australian 
Educational Researcher, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 355–82. 
 
Lukes, S 2005, Political Power: A radical view, 2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 
and New York. 
 
Macfarlane, B 2012, Intellectual Leadership in Higher Education: Renewing the role of the 
university professor, Routledge, London. 
15 
 
 
Marginson, S 2010, 'Higher Education as a Global Field', in S Marginson, P Murphy & M 
Peters (eds), Global Creation: Space, mobility and synchrony in the age of the knowledge 
economy, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 201–28. 
 
Maton, K 2005, 'A question of autonomy: Bourdieu's field approach and higher education 
policy', Journal of Education Policy, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 687–704. 
 
Rawolle, S 2010a, 'Practice chains of production and consumption: mediatized practices 
across social fields', Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, vol. 31, no. 1, 
pp. 121–35. 
 
Rawolle, S 2010b, 'Understanding the mediatisation of educational policy as practice', 
Critical Studies in Education, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 21–39. 
 
Rawolle, S & Lingard, B 2008, 'The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and researching education 
policy', Journal of Education Policy, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 729–41. 
 
Rawolle, S & Lingard, B 2013, 'Bourdieu and Educational Research: thinking tools, 
relational thinking, beyond epistemological innocence', in M Murphy (ed.), Social theory and 
education research: understanding Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu and Derrida, Routledge, 
New York, pp. 117–37. 
 
Reay, D 2004a, 'Cultural capitalists and academic habitus: classed and gendered labour in UK 
higher education', Women's Studies International Forum, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 31–9. 
 
Reay, D 2004b, '`It's all becoming a habitus': beyond the habitual use of habitus in 
educational research', British Journal of Sociology of Education, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 431–44. 
 
Robbins, D 2004, 'The transcultural transferability of Bourdieu's sociology of education', 
British Journal of Sociology of Education, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 416–28. 
 
Rowlands, J 2013, 'Academic boards: less intellectual and more academic capital in higher 
education governance?', Studies in Higher Education, vol. 38, no. 9, pp. 1274–89. 
 
Rowlands, J & Rawolle, S 2013, 'Neoliberalism is not a theory of everything: a Bourdieuian 
analysis of illusio in educational research', Critical Studies in Education, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 
260–72. 
 
Swartz, D 1997, Culture and Power: The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Swartz, D 2002, 'The sociology of habit: the perspective of Pierre Bourdieu', The 
Occupational Therapy Journal of Research, vol. 22, no. Winter 2002, Supplement, pp. 615–
95. 
 
Wacquant, L 1989, 'Towards a reflexive sociology: a workshop with Pierre Bourdieu', 
Sociological Theory, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 26–63. 
 
16 
 
Wacquant, L 2011, 'Habitus as topic and tool: reflections on becoming a prize fighter', 
Qualitative Research in Psychology, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 81–92. 
 
Waitere, HJ, Wright, J, Tremaine, M, Brown, S & Pause, CJ 2011, 'Choosing whether to 
resist or reinforce the new managerialism: the impact of performance-based research funding 
on academic identity', Higher Education Research & Development, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 205–
17. 
 
Warde, A 2004, Practice and field: Revising Bourdieusian concepts, CRIC Discussion Paper 
No. 65, University of Manchester, Manchester, retrieved 10 March 2010, 
<http://www.cric.ac.uk/cric/Pdfs/DP65.pdf>. 
 
Webb, J 2012, 'The logic of practice? Art, the academy, and fish out of water', Text, vol. 14, 
no. special issue website series: beyond practice–led research, pp. 1–15. 
 
 
 
i Rawolle (2010a) suggests that Bourdieu also uses the notion of practice in a fourth way, 
referring to products or outcomes of practice, such as a policy text or a piece of scholarly 
work (Bourdieu 1988), although we think this could also be conceived as an aspect of 
Warde’s second practice category. 
                                                 
